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Abstract
A critical presentation of Rovelli’s “evolving constants of motion”
is given. Previous criticisms by Kucharˇ concerning the role of factor
ordering and the non-existence of observables are dealt with and shown
to be unfounded. Kucharˇ’s criticisms that this approach does not
solve the global, multiple choice or Hilbert space problems of time are
confirmed, and new insight into why this is so is obtained.
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Rovelli[1] has proposed that one can interpret “timeless” parametrized
theories, such as canonical quantum gravity, in terms of “evolving constants
of motion.” Kucharˇ has criticized this approach on a number of grounds,
from issues of factor ordering[2] to the existence of observables[3], but, as a
means of working with parametrized theories, there is much to recommend
it. Some important conclusions can be learned from an independent critical
analysis.
In this paper, Rovelli’s approach will be shown to be essentially the
Heisenberg picture as formulated in a parametrized theory. The evolv-
ing constants of motion are observables which commute with the super-
Hamiltonian[4], and they can be constructed from solutions of the Heisenberg
equations of motion. One does not have to solve a factor ordering problem
to find them. Existence of such solutions and hence of observables is guar-
anteed, and Kucharˇ’s doubts[3] to the contrary are unfounded. On the other
hand, Rovelli’s program does fail to solve many of the problems of time[2],
including the global problem of time, the multiple choice problem and the
Hilbert space problem. The reason is that while the solutions to the Heisen-
berg equations of motion can be found without specifying the Hilbert space
structure of a theory and without specifying a foliation of spacetime, to have
a complete quantum theory, these must be specified and the observables do
not determine them. In particular, self-adjointness of observables is insuffi-
cient to determine the inner product.
1 Rovelli’s evolving constants of motion
Rovelli’s approach[1] is perhaps best described in the context of parametrized
quantum mechanics. This allows the freedom to be specific in examples with-
out worrying about the particular structure of something like the Wheeler-
DeWitt equation. One begins by working in an extended phase space which
contains time and its conjugate momentum as well as the spatial phase space
variables. I use bold face letters (q,p) to denote the collection of extended
phase space variables, (q0, p0) for time and its conjugate momentum, and
(q, p) to denote the spatial phase space variables. It is convenient to work
as if there were only one spatial degree of freedom, but this is notational. I
assume that the extended phase space has the topology R2n+2, where n is
the number of spatial degrees of freedom, and that the extended phase space
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variables satisfy the canonical commutation relations: in an obvious index
notation,
[qµ, pν] = iδµν , [qµ, qν ] = 0, [pµ, pν ] = 0. (1)
Consider a classical action in parametrized form
S =
∫
dλ
(
pq˙−N(λ)Hcl(q,p)
)
, (2)
whereHcl(q,p) is called the super-Hamiltonian, N(λ) will be called the lapse,
and the dot indicates differentiation with respect to the affine parameter λ.
In non-relativistic physics, the super-Hamiltonian is
Hcl(q,p) = p0 +Hcl(q, p, q0). (3)
The “super” prefix distinguishes it from the familiar HamiltonianHcl(q, p, q0).
The equations of motion are found by variation. Variation of the lapse
gives the super-Hamiltonian constraint
Hcl(q,p) = 0. (4)
This constraint is the signature of a parametrized theory. Varying the ex-
tended phase space variables gives the Hamilton equations of motion
q˙µ = N(λ){qµ,Hcl}, p˙µ = N(λ){pµ,Hcl}. (5)
When this system is quantized, one finds the (operator-valued) super-
Hamiltonian constraint
H(q,p) = 0. (6)
and the Heisenberg equations of motion
q˙µ = −iN(λ)[qµ,H], p˙µ = −iN(λ)[pµ,H]. (7)
Kucharˇ’s first objection[2] is that there is more than one way to quantize a
given classical system to obtain the quantum H(q,p). This is certainly true,
but it is the generic problem one faces when quantizing anything. At the
present time, there is no answer to this “multiple choice” problem, except
by appeal to experiment. As such, it is a question about choosing between
candidate quantum theories and not an obstruction to formulating them. I
assume that a factor ordering of the super-Hamiltonian has been given.
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The presence of the super-Hamiltonian constraint raises the so-called
problem of the frozen formalism[5]. In a theory with (first-class) constraints,
observables are defined to be functions which commute (weakly) with all of
the constraints. This is necessary because otherwise the action of an ob-
servable would take one out of the constraint hypersurface. But here, the
super-Hamiltonian would seem to be the generator of time translations, so
that if an observable commutes with H, it must be a constant of the motion.
Where then are the dynamics one expects of observables? Rovelli[1] intro-
duced the “evolving constants of motion” to resolve the apparent paradox.
The multiple conflicting uses of the word “observable” were discussed in [4],
and a simple example was done to show that, properly understood, there is
in fact no problem.
The resolution is based on the recognition that observables are members
of families of constants of motion parametrized by a label related to time.
Given a self-adjoint operator to be measured, it generically has a realization
as a distinct observable at each instant of time. Its dynamical evolution is
then a reflection of its motion through the family of constants of motion with
the passage of time.
To be concrete, consider the elementary example of the parametrized free
particle
H = p0 +
1
2
p2 (8)
The collection of operators,
Q(t) = q + p(t− q0), (9)
parametrized by t, are easily verified to be observables
[Q(t),H] = 0. (10)
To interpret these observables correctly, one must pass through an unfa-
miliar step. In the parametrized formalism, q0 is an operator. When it acts
on a state defined on a spacelike slice at a fixed instant of time, its eigenvalue
is the time associated to the slice on which that state is defined, thus
q0|ψ1, t1〉 = t1|ψ1, t1〉. (11)
The Hilbert space structure of the theory is still defined at fixed moments
of time. One cannot form superpositions of states at different moments of
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time—the instants of time define superselection sectors. This means that q0
is not integrated over in the Hilbert space inner product.
While q0 is a self-adjoint operator (its eigenvalues are all real), it is not an
“observable” in the practical sense of “something one observes/measures.”
One cannot build devices which couple to it directly. Thus, while a coupling
like HI = cq0q is acceptable mathematically, physically we can only build
devices which couple the (by definition, spatial) degrees of freedom of dif-
ferent subsystems. A coupling like HI may arise indirectly as a consequence
of the detailed evolution of some physical degree of freedom, but the true
coupling is between spatial degrees of freedom. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, q0 does not commutes with the super-Hamiltonian. It is not an
observable.
When the observable Q(t) acts on a state, one obtains
〈ψ1, t1|Q(t)|ψ1, t1〉 = 〈ψ1, t1|q + p(t− t1)|ψ1, t1〉. (12)
Thus, Q(t1) = q when acting on states defined on the slice at time t1. It
is essential to emphasize that one must give the time of the state that the
observable acts on to know its behavior. The operator (9) is not physically
meaningful on its own; it acquires meaning in conjunction with the states it
acts on. Another way to say this is that an operator does not have physical
meaning until one specifies the Hilbert space in which it acts.
Suppose one wishes to compute the expectation value of q at time t2 in
terms of states at time t1. One pulls back the operator q from time t2 to
time t1 and finds that one has the Heisenberg evolution, based on states at
time t1:
〈ψ2, t2|q|ψ2, t2〉 = 〈ψ1, t1|e
ip2(t2−t1)/2qe−ip
2(t2−t1)/2|ψ1, t1〉 (13)
= 〈ψ1, t1|q + p(t2 − t1)|ψ1, t1〉.
But, this is just
〈ψ2, t2|Q(t2)|ψ2, t2〉 = 〈ψ1, t1|Q(t2)|ψ1, t1〉. (14)
This confirms what we have been told: Q(t2) is a constant of the motion; it
has the same expectation value on every slice.
Here, we have held the observable fixed and varied the slice. Turning the
story around, if we hold the slice and state fixed, say at t1, and vary the
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observable, then, as a function of t, we have
〈ψ1, t1|Q(t)|ψ1, t1〉 = 〈ψ1, t1|q + p(t− t1)|ψ1, t1〉 (15)
= 〈ψ1, t1|e
ip2(t−t1)/2qe−ip
2(t−t1)/2|ψ1, t1〉.
Thus, Q(t) gives the Heisenberg evolution of q from t1 to t when acting on
states at t1! (More generally, Q(t) acting on states at time τ is the Heisenberg
evolution of q from τ to t.) Dynamical evolution is the movement of the self-
adjoint operator under observation through the family of constants of motion
as time passes.
To be complete, suppose one is in the Heisenberg picture with states
defined at time t1, and one wants to follow the Heisenberg evolution of the
operator q + p(t2 − t1), corresponding to Q(t2) acting on states at time t1.
One can decompose Q(t2) in terms of observables at time t1 by
Q(t2) = e
iP 2(t2−t1)/2Q(t1)e
−iP 2(t2−t1)/2 (16)
= Q(t1) + (t2 − t1)P.
(where P = p for all t). The Heisenberg evolution of q + p(t2 − t1) is then
〈ψ1, t1|Q(t) + (t2 − t1)P |ψ1, t1〉. (17)
In the general case of non-relativistic quantum mechanics with time-
independent Hamiltonian, the super-Hamiltonian is
H = p0 +H(q, p). (18)
Any self-adjoint operator f = f(q, p) can be promoted to a family of observ-
ables by computing its Heisenberg evolution
F (t; q, p, q0) = e
iH(t−q0)f(q, p)e−iH(t−q0). (19)
It is easily verified that
[F (t; q, p, q0),H] = 0. (20)
The expectation value of the operator f(q, p) at time t1 corresponds to the
expectation value of the observable F (t1; q, p, q0). Viewed as a function of t,
F (t; q, p, q0) acting on states at time t1 is simply the Heisenberg evolution of
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f(q, p) from time t1 to t. The novel feature of the observable F (t; q, p, q0) is
that its dependence on the operator q0 allows one to shift the fixed initial
slice on which the Heisenberg picture is defined. In a sense, some of the
freedom of the Schrodinger picture to change slices is incorporated, though
dynamics still remains with evolution of the operator. Here, that evolution
is seen to be movement through the family of observables as time passes.
Note that q0 cannot be promoted to an observable in this way. From (9),
one can construct an operator
Q0 =
1
p
(Q− q) + q0 (21)
which commutes withH—but it is not self-adjoint in the usual inner product.
Consider two of Kucharˇ’s remarks[3]: a) “one can observe dynamical
variables which are not perennial;” b) “perennials are often difficult to ob-
serve.” (“Perennial” is synonymous with observable as used here.) Neither
of these remarks is truly in conflict with what has just been described. On
first consideration, the self-adjoint operator q (at time t1) is measurable[6],
and it does not commute with the super-Hamiltonian, so it is not an observ-
able/perennial. Kucharˇ’s statement is apparently correct. Rovelli takes one
small further step. He recognizes that at time t1, q = Q(t1), that is, it is an
instance of an observable. In Rovelli’s scheme, every dynamical variable at
an instant is simply the instantaneous form of some observable. This seems a
modest step, but it saves one the mental gymnastics of coping with operators
which may take one out of the constraint surface, by assuring that they never
do.
Kucharˇ’s second remark is a fact. If one attempts to observe Q(t2) at
time t1, this may be difficult. Fortunately, we don’t experience time in the
Heisenberg picture, and there is nothing which says we must try to do so.
At each instant of time, there are a collection of observables which are com-
paratively easy to measure, and these are the ones our attention focuses on.
Other observables may be difficult to measure, and our effort to determine
them will depend on our interest in them.
This brings us to Kucharˇ’s key question. He asks, how is t to be observed?
In the present context, this question is somewhat misdirected, but it is a very
important question in its place and is discussed at length in [7]. Ostensibly,
Kucharˇ wants to argue that to observe change, one must measure something
which is not an observable. He argues that one must know t to know when
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to measure a particular observable. On the face of it, this seems reasonable,
but it puts a false emphasis on t and in doing so misses an essential point.
One does not choose to measure Q(t) at some instant because one knows
that instant is labelled by t. No, one chooses to measure an operator, say
q, at the instant which is “now,” and there is an observable associated to
this operator—which observable, in an absolute sense, being irrelevant. At
a different instant, one again measures q, now associated to a different ob-
servable, and generally the values obtained are different. Change has been
measured. It is true that there is a hidden active agent in the passage of
time, but it is enough that it happens. It is inferred only indirectly by the
fact that the value of the observable changes.
Alternatively, as a theorist outside of the system, one can select a slice
and measure q there. It gives a value associated to one observable. When q
is measured again on a different slice, a distinct value associated to another
observable is obtained. Change has been measured.
Generally, we want more than to show that observables take different
values. We want to coordinate the change in those values. It is not sufficient
that time pass; we must mark the passage of time. This cannot be done in
the model at hand. It has only one simultaneously measurable observable.
Kucharˇ asserts that q0 is the hand of an ideal Newtonian clock. This is
false: q0 is not measurable because it is not a degree of freedom of a physical
subsystem.
The traditional approach is to introduce an additional degree of freedom,
say with Hamiltonian H = px, and call it a clock. This Hamiltonian is used
here solely to illustrate a point. As it is not bounded from below, it is un-
physical, but consider it temporarily to be a measurable subsystem. (Clocks
are critically discussed more fully in [7].) A second family of observables
(simultaneously measurable with Q(t)) can be constructed
X(t) = x+ t− q0. (22)
X(t) is the hand of the clock, and it can be used to coordinate different
measurements of Q(t).
Suppose that at some initial instant, arbitrarily labelled t1, the x-sub-
system is in an eigenstate of X(t1) with eigenvalue x1. The state of the
full system at t1 is then |ψ1(q), x1, t1〉. The state of the x-subsystem at a
later time t2 can be deduced from the constancy of the observable X(t2).
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Computed at time t1, one finds
〈ψ1, x1, t1|X(t2)|ψ1, x1, t1〉 = x1 + t2 − t1 (23)
= 〈ψ2, x1 + t2 − t1, t2|X(t2)|ψ1, x1 + t2 − t1, t2〉.
This is what one expects from Heisenberg evolution from t1 to t2 using the
H = px.
By repeatedly measuring x as time passes, one can wait a predetermined
x-interval between measurements of Q(t). One need never know the depen-
dence of Q(t) on t because one will be able to infer a dependence on X(t)
instead. It should be repeated that X(t) refers to the collection of outcomes
of measurements of x—the label t is largely a convenience to distinguish be-
tween different values of the outcomes. Again, behind the whole process, it
is assumed that “time passes.” This may be justified either by appeal to
experience or by saying that this is the phrase which describes the process of
sequentially considering the states associated with different values of X(t).
While X(t) can be measured on any slice, it is natural to measure x on some
slice and assign X(t) to the value obtained there. Having done so, one may
measure q on the same slice and assign Q(t) to that value.
The point here is that the passage of time is an external experiential, if
you will, phenomenon. The evolving constants of motion do not explain the
passage of time. They show that when one observes measurable quantities
like q at a sequence of experienced instants of time tk, these observations can
be understood as the measurement of observables Q(tk) which commute with
the super-Hamiltonian H. To some, the use of observables which commute
with H may seem unnecessary, and they will say one is really measuring q
which does not commute with H. It is not that one cannot do physics in this
way. It is a question of whether it is in keeping with the spirit of other tenets
of mathematics and quantum physics where one is ill-disposed to operators
which can take one out of the Hilbert space or constraint surface.
2 Observables and Integrability
Another of Kucharˇ’s arguments against Rovelli’s evolving constants of mo-
tion concerns the existence of observables that commute with the super-
Hamiltonian constraint. Kucharˇ[3] reminds us of Poincare´’s results on the
nonexistence of further integrals of the motion beyond the classical integrals
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(energy, center of mass momentum, and angular momentum) for systems like
the asymmetric top and the three-body problem. He goes on to argue that
gravity itself is unlikely to be integrable (cf. [8]) and therefore there will not
be a complete set of observables with which to characterize a system. There
is a confusion of terms in this objection, with Kucharˇ and Rovelli talking
past each other.
The problem is with what it means to be a constant of motion. Both
Kucharˇ and Rovelli agree at the outset that an observable which commutes
with the super-Hamiltonian is a constant of motion. The difficulty follows as
Kucharˇ[3] begins to speak of what are often referred to as first integrals of
the motion while Rovelli speaks of what may be called “second integrals” of
the motion[9], but are more readily recognized as solutions of the equation
of motion. When integrating a system of second order differential equations,
such as equations of motion, one integration may reduce the order of some
equation by one and one obtains a “first integral.” The energy and the
momenta of ignorable coordinates are obtained by such a first integration
of the Euler-Lagrange equations. These are all first integrals of the motion.
A second integration produces a “second integral,” i.e. the solution of the
equation.
Since there are existence and uniqueness theorems for the solutions of
the equations of motion of dynamical systems, including Einstein’s field equa-
tions, the existence of second integrals is not in doubt. Each solution is given
uniquely in terms of its initial data, and it is considered a trivial observation
that these initial data are constants of motion for that solution. There is
a canonical transformation which takes one from any point along a solution
back to its initial conditions, so there are canonical transformations which
trivialize the motion of the system. The problem with second integrals of the
motion is finding them! That is the central challenge of dynamics: solving
the equations of motion. This is why first integrals of motion are so valuable.
Their existence assists in the integration of the equation of motion.
An alternative definition of a first integral is as a function of the posi-
tions and velocities which is constant, A(q(t), q˙(t)) = constant, along every
solution of the equations of motion. It appears that the key feature that
distinguishes such an integral from a second integral is that the function A
has no explicit dependence on time, but this is misleading. Kucharˇ attempts
to confuse the distinction between first and second integrals by fixing the en-
ergy. The solutions to the equations of motion at fixed energy do not involve
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the time, so it seems by this definition any integrals must be first integrals.
This is of course absurd. A non-integrable system with time-independent
Hamiltonian for which one has the exact time-dependent solution for a given
set of initial conditions does not acquire first integrals simply because one
fixes the energy nor does the solution cease to exist.
The fixed-energy second integrals are found by inverting the solution of
one of the variables for the time and using this to eliminate the time in the
remaining solutions of the other variables. It is clear that, when one does
this, the expressions for the other variables will involve both initial and final
values of the variable which has been used to eliminate time. A true first
integral however only depends on initial variables. In an example in the next
section, (29) is a first integral while (31) is only a second integral. This is the
essential distinction between first and second integrals. In the usual context,
it is the time which occurs as a difference of final and initial values, and that
is why second integrals are associated with time-dependence.
A system of n degrees of freedom is said to be integrable if it admits
n first integrals of the motion in involution. Such a system is equivalent
under a time-independent canonical transformation to a system constrained
to move geodesically on a regular (flat) torus. It should be emphasized that
to say a system is non-integrable does not mean that the solutions to its
equations of motion cannot be characterized. It means that they are not
equivalent to geodesic motion on a torus. Thus, geodesic motion on a two-
dimensional higher genus Riemann surface of constant negative curvature is
easily described, for example by circular arcs in the Poincare´ disk tesselated
by the fundamental domain appropriate to the surface, but the motion is
non-integrable.
The evidence is that general relativity is not an integrable theory, and
that there are few if any first integrals[8]. This is not really surprising.
It is in fact a very good thing. I interpret it in the following way. Since
general relativity is not integrable, there is not a time-independent canonical
transformation to variables in which all the momenta are constant and their
conjugate variables evolve linearly in time. This means that the universe
cannot be in a superposition of eigenstates of a complete collection of t-
independent observables (where t is a final value of the time). As a result,
time exists. We cannot be trapped in the frozen formalism.
The foundation of Rovelli’s approach is the observation that nevertheless
the universe is in a superposition of eigenstates of a complete collection of t-
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dependent observables. Each of these observables are simply the Heisenberg
evolution of some functions of the initial data. If we choose to work in the
Heisenberg picture, the universe is frozen in a particular state. At each
instant of time, however, we must use a different collection of observables to
decompose the state of the universe. This is because we must use a collection
of observables evaluated at that moment of time and therefore necessarily a
collection of time-independent observables. Since general relativity is not
integrable, we cannot use the same set of time-independent observables at
every time, so our set must change. In the Heisenberg picture, it is the
changing of the set of observables that we use to decompose the state of the
universe which reflects the passage of time.
3 The Problems of Time
Returning to the general situation, the challenge in constructing Rovelli’s
evolving constants of motion is to solve the Heisenberg equations of motion.
Kucharˇ[2] raises several objections about one’s ability to do this, but the
immediate form of his objections rest largely on a misapprehension of the
task one faces. Kucharˇ approaches the problem of construction as one of
factor ordering a classical solution of the problem. After emphasizing the
difficulty of factor ordering in general, he goes on to ridicule the existence of a
time function which he argues is a necessary part of the procedure. He points
out the “global problem of time”—that generally there are obstructions to
foliating extended phase space with a single time function—and the “multiple
choice problem”—that one could use different time functions and one must
prove that the quantum theories are equivalent. He argues that Rovelli’s hope
to solve the Hilbert space problem, that is to put a Hilbert space structure on
the space of solutions to the super-Hamiltonian constraint, is in vain because
of the multiple choice problem. He concludes that Rovelli cannot solve any
of the problems of time.
The situation is not quite so grim as this, though the conclusions are valid.
Kucharˇ’s version of Rovelli’s approach is a straw man which distorts both the
strengths and weaknesses of a careful treatment. The role of the time function
is overemphasized, and one especially does not have to factor order a classical
solution. One simply needs to solve the Heisenberg equations of motion (7).
Doing so may be non-trivial, but existence and uniqueness of the solution
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are assured. Perturbative expansions in Λ− Λ0 =
∫ λ
λ0
N(λ)dλ of the solution
are easily obtained in the finite dimensional case, and quantum canonical
transformation methods are under development to obtain expressions with
well-defined factor ordering in more closed form[10].
van Hove’s theorem may haunt the passage between classical and quan-
tum theory, but it is impotent if one does not bother with the crossing and
works always in the quantum realm. The real difficulties are serious enough
without adding to them. For example, it is all too true that the field theory
case is of a different magnitude of difficulty than finite dimensional examples.
The functional nature of N(λ) and the consequent notion of “bubble-time”
necessarily complicates the production and representation of solutions. It is
not an overstatement to say that Rovelli’s approach is in a state of develop-
ment, but a less polemical critique may clarify the issues and lead to further
progress.
To obtain reparameterization-invariant observables, one must eliminate
the affine parameter Λ− Λ0 in the expressions for the solutions, and this
raises the first serious obstacle. (A different procedure involving an averag-
ing over Λ− Λ0 is discussed in [11] and may avoid this difficulty.) To isolate
Λ− Λ0, one must invert the solution of one variable for Λ− Λ0. One may of
course perform canonical transformations on the variables before attempting
the inversion. There is unfortunately no non-abelian form of the implicit
function theorem of which I’m aware, so it is not clear when this can be
done, though some theorem seems likely to be true. Additionally, inversion
is generally not unique, because of branch choices or other non-analytic be-
havior. This means that not every solution of the equations of motion has
the same form in terms of the deparametrized variables.
As a simple example, consider the super-Hamiltonian
H = −
1
2
p20 − aq0 +
1
2
p2 + bq. (24)
Let Qµ, Pµ denote the evolved variables and qµ = qµ(Λ0), pµ = pµ(Λ0) denote
the initial conditions. The Heisenberg equations of motion are then
Q˙µ = −i[Qµ,H], P˙µ = −i[Pµ,H], (25)
where H is the super-Hamiltonian expressed in terms of the evolved variables
Qµ, Pµ, and dot means differentiation with respect to Λ. The solution of
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these equations are easily found
P0 = a(Λ− Λ0) + p0, (26)
Q0 = −
1
2
a(Λ− Λ0)
2 − p0(Λ− Λ0) + q0,
P = −b(Λ − Λ0) + p,
Q = −
1
2
b(Λ− Λ0)
2 + p(Λ− Λ0) + q.
Solving for Λ− Λ0 in each of these, one finds the expressions
Λ− Λ0 =
P0 − p0
a
(27)
= −
p0
a
±
1
a
(p20 + 2a(q0 −Q0))
1/2
= −
P − p
b
=
p
b
±
1
b
(p2 + 2b(q −Q))1/2
The quadratic equations are solved by shifting Λ− Λ0 to cancel the term lin-
ear in Λ− Λ0 and then taking the square root of the remaining expression.
When solving for Λ− Λ0, it is assumed to commute with all of the variables,
and there are no ordering problems with its coefficients. On the other hand,
the evolved variables do not commute with the initial ones; the various com-
mutators can be deduced by taking commutators with the solutions (26). In
this example, the forms of Λ− Λ0 are the same as they would be classically
(but with appropriate operator ordering of the square-roots).
Equating the first two of (27), one has
P0 = ±
(
p20 + 2a(q0 −Q0)
)1/2
. (28)
Classically it is clear why there are two solutions: for appropriate initial
conditions, a particle climbing in a linear potential passes a given point once
on its way up and again on the way down. If one uses the second form of
(27) to eliminate Λ− Λ0 in either P or Q, one will also get two solutions.
Only if one uses either the first or third forms of (27) will one find unique
forms for the deparametrized solutions, and that is because these forms are
linearly correlated to Λ− Λ0.
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Observables are formed by substituting the form of Λ− Λ0 obtained from
one solution in the solutions for the other variables. Here, one treats the
evolved and initial variables as commuting. Each expression consisting of
a function of evolved variables equated to a function of initial and evolved
variables is then an observable. For example, use the second form of Λ− Λ0
from (27). Substituting this in the first solution of (26), one has (28) as an
observable or alternatively
1
2
P 20 + aQ0 =
1
2
p20 + aq0 (29)
which one can verify satisfies
[
1
2
P 20 + aQ0,H] = 0. (30)
Note that this is a first integral because the initial and final variables are
separated.
Substituting the second form of Λ− Λ0 from (27) in the third solution of
(26), one finds
P =
bp0
a
±
b
a
(
p20 + 2a(q0 −Q0)
)1/2
+ p, (31)
which can be confirmed to satisfy [P,H] = 0. This is a second integral
because Q0 is present on the right-hand side and cannot be separated from
the initial variables. As well, the more complicated expression obtained for
Q also satisfies [Q,H] = 0. Note that because P and Q depend on Q0, they
are actually families of observables parametrized by the value of Q0. (Q0
fulfills the role that t played above.) Further observables can be found by
eliminating other forms of Λ− Λ0 and by taking functional combinations of
existing observables. Obviously, not all observables commute nor are they
necessarily independent.
The multivaluedness of the expressions for Λ− Λ0 is a reflection of the
global problem of time. When none of the variables has a single-valued
expression in terms of Λ− Λ0, then there is an obstruction to defining a
global time function (cf. [12] for one possible way to deal with this). There
is an important issue here which deserves closer study, but it is not altogether
clear that it is a problem. For example, in the present example, p0 is linearly
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correlated to Λ− Λ0 and would therefore be a good time function. Physics
however might dictate that q0 is the time. One has then some sort of time-
dependent relativistic super-Hamiltonian and it is not clear why there is a
problem if the classical or Heisenberg solutions to the equations of motion
are not single-valued in q0. Further work is needed on this point.
Having found a complete set of observables, Rovelli’s next step is to de-
termine the inner product by choosing one in which all of the observables
are self-adjoint. If he were successful in this, he would solve the Hilbert
space problem; he would succeed in putting a Hilbert space structure on the
solutions of the super–Hamiltonian constraint. Kucharˇ claims he must fail
because of a variant on the multiple choice problem: he can choose different
time functions to construct his observables, and for each he gets a different
set of observables; if one requires that all of these observables be self-adjoint
in the same inner product, there are bound to be problems. In the example
above, different ways to eliminate Λ− Λ0 correspond to different choices of
Kucharˇ’s time function. While related to the real issue, this argument may
lead one to miss the crucial point.
There is indeed a multiple choice problem which Rovelli has overlooked
which defeats this part of his program. So far we have the solutions to the
Heisenberg equations of motion, but these solutions are independent of the
Hilbert space structure. It has not been emphasized, but the procedure for
solving the Heisenberg equations of motion either perturbatively or by canon-
ical transformation[10] involves the algebra of the commutation relations but
not the inner product or the states. In the solutions, the spatial and temporal
variables are on an equal footing and are indistinguishable. The symmetry
between spatial and temporal variables is broken however when one chooses
how to make the time-slice through extended configuration space on which
one normalizes states. There is nothing except association with physical
quantities and their experimental behavior to guide this choice. Simple in-
spection of the mathematical variables is insufficient. There is a different
inner product in which all of the observables are self-adjoint for nearly every
choice of slice through the extended configuration space.
As a simple example illustrative of this ambiguity, consider the massless
relativistic free particle,
H = −p20 + p
2 = 0. (32)
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The solution to the parametrized Heisenberg equations of motion are
Q = 2p(Λ− Λ0) + q, Q0 = −2p0(Λ− Λ0) + q0, (33)
with P = p and P0 = p0 constant. There is clearly symmetry between q and
q0 in these equations. Eliminating Λ− Λ0 by solving for it in terms of q0
gives
Q(Q0) = −
p
p0
(Q0 − q0) + q. (34)
This system has one physical degree of freedom and requires two observables.
They can be chosen to be P and Q. Requiring that they both be self-
adjoint on a hypersurface of constant t [the eigenvalue of q0 as in (11)] in
a Hermitian inner product, one would find an inner product. On the other
hand, one could solve (34) for Q0(Q), and with P0, one could find a different
inner product integrated over a hypersurface of constant q. The choice of
hypersurface distinguishes these from the infinitely many other possibilities,
and the correct choice is dictated by physics. The requirement that the
observable be self-adjoint is not enough.
In the discussion in [13] of the analogous case of a massive relativistic free
particle, it is argued that a unique inner product is found when one requires
the boost operatorQ0P−QP0 = q0p−qp0 (and say P ) be self-adjoint. [This is
just another rewriting of the observable (34).] A hidden choice has been made
when the inner product takes the form of an integral over a surface at constant
p0. In the general case of the Wheeler-DeWitt equation, one does not know
which variable in the super-Hamiltonian is time, and one does not know
how to select the hypersurface on which to define the inner product. The
example here makes this obvious. The only a priori justification one has to
consider an inner product integrated over slices of constant q0 is the historical
convention that the variable with the subscript 0 is time. I could however
have maliciously mislabelled the variables, and q might be the physical time.
(For completeness, I recall also that it is well known that one cannot use the
signature of the operator to help to identify time because the signature of
the Wheeler-DeWitt operator is unrelated to time.) Just as in the classical
theory, inspection of the solutions of the equations of motion is insufficient
to determine which variable is time.
Incidentally, the global problem of time seems to have yet another oppor-
tunity to make an appearance. Having chosen one slice on which to define
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one’s inner product, it is not clear that this slice can be extended into a folia-
tion. It is difficult to say more without specific examples, but the possibility
would seem to exist.
It may have been too optimistic to hope that the Hilbert space problem
would be solved by the evolving constants of the motion, but this should
not detract from the other real accomplishments of this approach. The
Heisenberg picture is brought to the fore, and the solutions of the Heisen-
berg equations of motion are seen not to require a time function for their
definition. They provide a system of observables which commute with the
super-Hamiltonian, and through their behavior dynamics can be analyzed.
Space and time are on equal footing in these observables. The essential open
problem is to define the Hilbert space of states on which these observables
act. There is an important interplay between states and time.
I would like to think J. York for helpful discussions. This work was
supported in part by National Science Foundation grant PHY-9413207.
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